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Jennifer Golbeck

Report Title

Summary Report for the Army Research Organization (ARO) Workshop on Social Trust Computing

ABSTRACT

(a) Papers published in peer-reviewed journals (N/A for none)

From July 29-30, 2010, a workshop on computing with social trust was held at the University of Maryland, College Park. Leading researchers from the diverse sub-areas relating to social trust computation came together to discuss future directions for research in the field. The goal of these discussions was to build a set of recommendations for a potential BAA in the area. This report summarizes their presentations and recommendations for areas of future work.

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(b) Papers published in non-peer-reviewed journals (N/A for none)
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Scientific Progress

Summarized presentations and recommendations for areas of future work.

Technology Transfer

Summary Report for the Army Research Organization (ARO) Workshop on Social Trust Computing

Jennifer Golbeck

September 14, 2010

From July 29-30, 2010, a workshop on computing with social trust was held at the University of Maryland, College Park. Leading researchers from the diverse sub-areas relating to social trust computation came together to discuss future directions for research in the field. The goal of these discussions was to build a set of recommendations for a potential BAA in the area. This report summarizes their presentations and recommendations for areas of future work.

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1 Attendees

- Jen Golbeck (UMD)
- Ugur Kuter (UMD)
- Jim Hendler (RPI)
- John O'Donnovan (UCSB)
- Tobias Hollerer (UCSB)
- Yolanda Gil (ISI)
- Chris Hazard (NC State)
- Minindar Singh (NC State)
- Michael Reiter (UNC)
- Ronald R. Yager (Iona)
- Felix Wu (UC Davis)
- Cliff Wang & ARO researchers

2 Researcher Presentations

Slides from all presentations are included as appendices to this report. Below is a summary of the issues raised by the participants.

2.1 Cliff Wang

Discussion Goals

- 1. How is this topic multidisciplinary? Be specific.
- 2. Why is this topic basic research and not technology development?
- 3. What scientific understanding is lacking in this topic area?
- 4. Why has that understanding not been obtainable? What are the difficulties?
- 5. What recent scientific breakthroughs or accomplishments that would now enable us to do so?

- 6. Why more research is needed to achieve that understanding?
- 7. By what criteria will the research be judged to be successful?
- 3, 4, 5 are particularly important. What are the fundamental things we need to achieve?

Information used to come from sensors, but now it comes from a combination of sensors and humans, and there is contradictory information. More and more information is coming in from social interactions. How do you make a decision? What is a scientific method for doing that?

Can we trace information back to the origin? (This raises the provenance question)

2.2 Ron Yager

Title: Fuzzy and Soft Technologies for Trust

Many aspects of social trust computing require the processing of information that is imprecise, uncertain and subjective which can benefit from the use fuzzy and other soft computing technologies. The focus of our talk will be on the role that fuzzy sets and other soft granular technologies can play in furthering trust modeling and research. We shall describe an extension of social network modeling that uses fuzzy sets to build a bridge between the types of linguistic terms which humans use to communicate, reason, and understand and the formal representation of the social networks. This allows for the human linguistic articulation of trust related concepts to be translated into computational manageable mathematical objects. An important task in trust computing is aggregation, this occurs both in the determination of reputation as well as in path based process of determining trust via social network connections. We describe a number of semantically based aggregation tools developed in the soft computing framework and discuss the applicability to trust computing. These will allow one to process linguistically expressed measures of trust in addition to numeric ones. Closely related to this is the technology of linguistic summaries that allows one to formulate and manipulate statements such as "In most cases John is a highly trustworthy partner." We shall briefly discuss the paradigm of participatory learning which can provide a framework for context based trust determination.

2.3 Mike Reiter

Title: Leveraging Community for Usable Security

The proliferation of always-connected mobile devices permits one's community to be reached at nearly any moment. We will present ideas for using this pervasive community presence to manage security policies, to exercise one's authority, and to protect the security of one's own information. Part of this talk will draw from our experience with Grey, a system we have deployed on two university campuses to enable users to leverage their mobile devices for exercising and delegating authority to physical and virtual resources.

2.4 Felix Wu

Title: "SCOSK: Social-Centric Operating System Kernel"

In this short talk, I will discuss the possibility of pushing social informatics into the Operating System kernel, mainly for the purpose of cyber security. We will first go over a few cyber events/attacks as motivation examples. Then, we will discuss the benefits of managing social resources, as a first-class citizen, inside an OS kernel. Finally, if time allows, we will go over a few technical/research challenges in realizing SCOSK.

2.5 Munindar Singh

Title: Trust Middleware as a Basis for Social Computing

Recent research into trust has yielded approaches that consider evidence, incentives, cognitive states, and social relationships.

But the key aspect of trust that underlies the above approaches is itself largely ignored. Specifically, trust reflects a dependence of one agent on another for a purpose. The mutual dependence of agents and their successes or failures pertaining to it may be reflected in social relationships, expressed cognitively, motivated by incentives, or recorded in evidence. But the representation and reasoning about dependence is a central concern that merits serious study.

Based on the above, we motivate a trust middleware as a central logical component for social computing. The middleware would assist agents by bookkeeping their trust relationships. It would help realize application-specific architectures that support diverse social computing applications, such as those involving personal, communal, organizational, and contractual relationships.

2.6 Ugur Kuter

Every day, people and organizations exchange information and make decisions through networked entities. Sometimes the nodes of these networks

may be other people or organizations; sometimes, they are communication hubs, Internet servers, or software agents. In any case, the activities, goals, and plans of any entity depend on the trust and credibility of the networked entities and the information they spread across the network. Such notions of trust and credibility also affect how certain events happen in the world, which are not under control of the decision-making agent. Thus, it is important to understand how agents or groups of agents use resources in the world, how they produce information based on those resources, and how those resources determine their plans, activities, and goals over time. To date, social dynamics in networks have been largely neglected in systems that help to make decisions under spatial and temporal constraints. I'll describe some background and the works we're doing currently at UMd in this specific research topic. I'll then summarize several future directions.

2.7 Chris Hazard (presented by Minindar Singh)

Title: Trust and Incentives: Dynamics and Strategy

Abstract: In multiagent interactions, such as e-commerce and peer-topeer file sharing, being able to accurately assess the trustworthiness of other agents is important for agents to protect themselves from losing utility. We focus on an agents' discount factors (time preference of utility) as a direct measure of the agent's trustworthiness in a number of settings. We prove that an agent's discount factor, when in context of the agent's valuations and capabilities, is isomorphic to trustworthiness for a set of reasonably general assumptions and definitions. Further, despite the large body of work in reputation and trust in dynamic multiagent environments, no metrics exist to directly and quantitatively evaluate and compare reputation systems. We present a common conceptual interface for reputation systems and a set of four measurable desiderata that are broadly applicable across multiple domains, inspired by dynamical systems theory. We discuss the implications, strengths, and limitations of our desiderata. Our discount factor trustworthiness model performs well across the desiderata when measured against other established reputation models from the literature. We briefly conclude with some preliminary work extending our dynamics and strategy perspective into the dimensions of signaling and sanctioning as a way of designing and assessing trust systems.

2.8 John O'Donovan

Based at the Four Eyes Lab, Dept. of Comp Science, University of California Santa Barbara, the WiGis project centers around visualization of large-scale, highly interactive graphs in a user's web browser. Our software is delivered natively in your web browser and does not require any plug-ins or add-ons. Our method produces clean, smooth animation in a browser through asynchronous data transfer (AJAX), and access to rich server side resources without the need for technologies such as Flash, Java Applets, Flex or Silverlight. We believe that our new techniques have broad reaching potential across the web. Below is a windowed version of the system.

The WiGis framework has been applied as a solution in a diverse set of scientific, social, computational and other systems that require user interaction with networked data. Please see the left menu for some examples and live demos, or click the button below to examine the core framework on some static data.

2.9 CTA discussion

The trust research taking place in the Army's centers for network science is a vast undertaking. Nearly all of the attendees are affiliated with the CTA effort. A discussion of the research areas covered in the different centers and cross-cutting research initiatives identified topics being covered and those not addressed by the centers. The following research questions are currently not part of the work taking place under CTA:

- 1. Non-network centric work Since the CTA is focused on network science, non-network related trust issues are outside that domain. Of particular interest to the workshop attendees are behavioral and linguistic trust models. Behavioral models in particular are part of a rich research history that has new applications to the wealth of data from online social interactions. A sub-topic discussed in this area is the motivation to trust. What causes people to trust and what do they see as its benefits?
- 2. Dynamics of trust This topic addresses how do trust values change, if forgiveness is considered, the changing justifications for trust levels, etc. Trust dynamics are of interest to many groups but are not well studied, so this is a question with lots of potential.
- 3. Distrust / negative trust There have been a few studies on distrust or negative trust values, but it is problematic to use in many models.

However, like trust dynamics, it is an issue of great interest to the military and to trust researchers.

- 4. Trust risk model A security model, where trust is bad and security can be compromised is quite different from a social model where trust is good because it helps with decision making and where risk is not as clearly defined. Looking at the overlap between these tracks of research is an open space and may lead to some interesting integrations of theories.
- 5. Use of game theory Trust and game theory fit well together and there is extensive literature on the topic. It is still an active area of work where new results are being produced, and this is not a topic of study in the CTA.

3 Ideas for Future Trust Research

After the presentations and discussions presented above, we discussed twelve areas that emerged as spaces for future work. Each topic discussion was led by a workshop attendee whose name is indicated parenthetically next to the topic. In the section below, each topic is described with possible research areas. Where appropriate, extra attention is given to the questions raised above by Cliff Wang regarding the research that's missing, why we can do it, and what the impact will be.

3.1 Dynamics of trust

(Jinghe Cho, Munindar)

How does trust change over time? What are the roles forgiveness, forgetfulness, regretfulness? How quickly do a person's actions propagate and affect trust that others have in them? How does that affect others in the network?

There are countless questions related to the dynamics of trust, and it is an area where there was a lot of enthusiasm at the workshop.

On a system level, there are issues of how the system impacts trust among users, how trust is represented, and how trust values are updated. Algorithmically, there are questions about how trust dynamics are represented in algorithms and how changes propagate through the network.

Finally, there are behavioral issues related to how dynamics affect and are affected by social structure and social groups.

This area of trust dynamics touches on many of the open areas not covered by CTA, and is one that the workshop attendees saw as a space that many of us could do work.

3.2 Trust/risk model

(Kevin)

Trust is a relationship that people use to mitigate risk. However, the study of risk itself is of interest to better understand trust. Furthermore, as mentioned above, risk plays an important part in security discussions, and this is a space where social and security oriented risk discussions can come together. Research topics in this space include the impact on decision making, uncertainty management, time sensitivity of decisions with respect to trust, and methods for minimizing risk and optimizing decision making.

3.3 Linguistics

(Presented by Ron, Chris)

The use of language for understanding trust has potential, particularly in the area of ontologies, topic modeling, and applications of LDA.

We discussed using computational linguistics as a mechanism for weighting trust, and for extracting trust from statements.

Linguistics also have potential for revealing why people have trust in others. It provides insight into personal interpretation of people and events that lead to trust. The technologies to pursue this work now exist, but they have not been extensively applied to study trust.

3.4 Human Behavior and Trust

(Ugur)

Studying the relationship between human behavior and trust is a wide open space for research. Looking at observed behavior - do actions indicate trusting or untrusting behavior - can be studied in many ways. Computational social science, game theory, using controlled experiments with users, and observing their behavior are all methods for doing research in this space.

Behavior and trust will also touch on questions of background and culture, which is of particular interest to military applications. It will also cover questions of impersonation, deception, and lying.

3.5 Trust aggregation and inference

(Ron, Ugur)

Trust inference is one of the more widely studied areas of trust. There are a number of algorithms published and implemented in systems. However, there are many questions left to be studied in this area. To date, there is no research on how to combine trust values from different sources, how to allow user control over algorithmic functions (e.g. should people have personalized trust scales, could and should trust aggregation functions vary between users).

Evaluation of these algorithms is also not standardized, partially because of the lack of public trust datasets. If a BAA is to encourage research in this space, evaluation should be encouraged and datasets should be provided to allow direct comparison of performance between algorithms.

3.6 Engineering trust systems

(Munindar)

While most of our discussions focused around theoretical and scientific research questions related to trust, there was limited interest in the engineering of systems. Munindar, who lead this discussion, raised issues of a trust middleware, centralized trust systems, and the ability to use trust across systems. This is a very different topic than the rest suggested by the workshop attendees, but could be an interesting area for research if a more engineering / system building approach is desirable.

3.7 Properties of trust systems

(Felix Wu)

Related to the engineering of trust systems, but a topic that received a more enthusiastic response, is that of properties of trust systems. This includes understanding global properties, like robustness (including antimanipulation / stabilization), achieving consensus, preserving diversity and protecting minorities, confidentiality, accountability, and incentives for participation.

Robustness brings us to issues of attack resistance. In trust systems, that will include somewhat traditional attack strategies, like collusions, but also questions of how social influence or reputation can be exploited to take advantage of others in the network. On the flip side, study of offensive strategies for disrupting trust networks falls within this area. This is useful for learning how to protect a network and for harming adversaries.

3.8 Leveraging trust in systems

(Mike)

One of the main reasons for studying and understanding trust is to use it in applications. While there has been some study of the effectiveness of trust in applications, there is a lot of exciting work to be done in this area. Application spaces where trust is used to improve other systems include recommender systems, trust in automation, and information filtering and personalization. Trust can also be reapplied to social systems; strengthening interactions, recommending relationships, and investigating the connection between trusting individuals and groups are all important research questions with many open problems.

3.9 Communication of trust

(John)

Once trust is used in applications, it may appear in back end systems like recommender systems or on front-end interface elements that indicate how trustworthy a person or their content is. For users to take advantage of the trust, there are questions of how (if at all) trust should be communicated to the end user and how users provide trust information to the system.

Research on communication of trust includes studying what is the right amount of trust to communicate to users (black box models vs. transparent models) and how entities in the system exchange information with one another. Research in this space will also allow comparison and performance differences between various trust models more easily.

3.10 Distrust

(Jen)

Distrust is an understudied question in this area. During the workshop, we raised a number of research issues including propagation and representation of distrust. However, while the workshop attendees recognized this as an important topic, there was little enthusiasm for this as an emerging area. Part of the reason it is not well studied now is that the unaddressed issues are quite complex and difficult to work with properly. Some argued that it may be impossible to use distrust in more than a very simple way. We felt it was unlikely that a BAA would lead to much progress on this topic.

3.11 Context of trust -

(Ron)

Context is an issue that is constantly raised in discussions of trust. It is certainly an important issue, as both the meaning of trust and its treatment in algorithms and models will vary as context changes. However, while we all recognized that it was important, there were no real research questions that emerged nor enthusiasm about this as a topic for the BAA.



Leveraging Community for Usable Security

Michael Reiter

Lawrence M. Slifkin Distinguished Professor Department of Computer Science University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill



High-Level Message

 With proliferation of always-connected mobile devices, your community is nearly always accessible to you

Can we make use of them to help with our own security?



Background: Grey

[w/ Bauer et al. 2004-present]

- Grey is an implementation of credentialsbased access control
- Utilizes smartphones as the means by which users exercise/delegate authority
- Grounded in formal logic to permit rigorous proof checking and assurance arguments
 - Also central to supporting reactive delegation



An Example Scenario



UNC can access online journals

- All members of the car can access ACM's onlin
- Alice is a member of the community
- Alice is writing the related work section of a paper and needs access to an online journal







An Example Scenario











An Example Scenario





Reactive Delegation

[w/ Bauer, Garriss 2005, 2007]






Grey Deployments

- Two deployments for physical access control
 - CMU's Collaborative Innovation Center
 - UNC's Fred Brooks Building







Benefits of Reactive Delegation [w/ Bauer, Cranor, Reeder, Vaniea 2007-8]

- Grey policies match user intentions better than those implemented by physical keys
- Inflexibility of physical keys caused people to implement "workarounds"
 - E.g., a "key drawer" where keys were stored (unlocked!) for those who knew where to look
- On-demand (reactive) delegation permitted a "least privilege" posture
 - Without undue risk of unavailability



Leveraging Community

- Reactive delegation is one instance of leveraging community to manage security
- Key question: Are there other applications in which community management can improve security with little overhead or inconvenience?
 - Sure, reputation systems ...
 - ... But how about something more personal?

UNC.edu
















Davis Social Links SCOSK: Social-Centric OS Kernel









UCDAYS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

SCOSK


- Social Informatics
 - Understand/Utilize ==> Manipulation
 - · Social Network has a dynamic perspective
 - One single giant SN versus per-application
 - Social Informatics inside the OS kernel?
- Application Context
 - Decision Making, Policy Enforcement, Community Development
 - Collaborative Tasks, Information Exchange


We are trying to make the information of social context and relationship explicit!




SMTP









07/29/2010

Social-Centric OS Kernel @ UM






SquirrelMail version 1.4.19 By the SquirrelMail Project Team

Davis Social Links Login					
Full Email: sfelixwu@gmail.com					
Password:	•••••				
Login					
Log in to: Gmail 💠					
□ Remember login server					

Instructions:

- 1. Join CyrusDSL
- Register your email with DSL (NOTE: You must type in your full email address, i.e.
- "yourname@gmail.com".)
- Log in above with your full email address and it's password.







OS Kernel

		system	-call	interf	ace to the kernel			
active file entries VNODE layer				active file entries				
				OBJECT / VNODE laye				socket
special devices			VM		local naming (UFS)		FS	SUCKEI
tty line	raw devices	raw spa		ap- ace gmt.	FFS	network		
discipline	devices	UISK	page cache					
character-device drivers		GEOM layer			M layer	network-		
		CAM layer		er	ATA layer		interface drivers	
		CAM device drivers		drivers	ATA device drivers			
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the hardware								




OS Kernel

- It's all about resources
 - CPU Cycles, Memory, File System, I/O Bandwidth...
 - Application Processes!
- Allocation and Abstraction
 - "Fairness/Efficiency"
 - "Provenance"



Social-Centric OS Kernel






OS Kernel

- It's all about resources
 - CPU Cycles, Memory, File System, I/O Bandwidth...
 - Application Processes!
- Allocation and Abstraction
 - "Fairness/Efficiency"
 - "Provenance"
- How do the SCOSK protect the core value of the SI against aggressive applications?



Farmville and Facebook






A Couple Issues

- · Careless in adding friends regardless ...
 - <u>Incentive</u> model at the "Facebook" level to balance such a behavior
- Certain Applications are pushing users to accept new friendships unconditionally.
 - But, how do we control the quality of the friendships, at least, in the context of a particular application?



A range of possibilities...


- Bit Torrent Peer selection
 - Currently no "Social" Relationship involved==> maybe "Reversed OSN"
- Farmville Neighbors
 - Must leverage Facebook friendship



What is the appropriate Social Informatics for application X?



Farmville and Facebook







Let's review...

 How social informatics is being accessed under Facebook?










FB-connect






friends.get
friends.getappusers




FAITH



FAITH (Facebook Application Identifier Translator & Hypervisor) like NAT (Network Address Translation)




Farmville and Facebook





- What is the best/effective VPSN for this application X?
 - Virtual Private Social Network








Social Network Transformation


Each application might need different OSN topologies.






Social-Centric OS


Managing Social Resources






- Let "users" (or community of users) define and control their social needs.
- And, the impact of VPSN to the backbone OSN or other VPSN needs to be carefully managed. (open problem)
 - Currently, we only provide "CSI isolation"









```
int CSI(...);
int propagate(vnode *);
CSI *get(vnode *);
int wait(vnode *, cond_t *);
int signal(vnode *, cond t *);
```


X-DSL 0x15EF2AC4

NE2000



How many? within how much time?


Social capitals/resources



The response from the dark side....

- obtain the expected social profile
- leverage a large number of compromised social bots
- each produce/consume a very small amount of SR





Subject: My present condition please help me out of this problem!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

From: TJ Hsieh ▼ Date: 3/2/10 2:58 AM

To: undisclosed recipients:; ▼

Tags: Important

I'm writing this with tears in my eyes,my fam and I came down here to Wales,United Kingdom for a short vacation unfortunately we were mugged at the park of the hotel where we stayed,all cash,credit card and cell were stolen off us but luckily for us we still have our passports with us.

We've been to the embassy and the Police here but they're not helping issues at all and our flight leaves in less than 3hrs from now but we're having problems settling the hotel bills and the hotel manager won't let us leave until we settle the bills i'm freaked out at the moment.


TJ Hsieh

"God bless you in 2010, the Sabbath Year before the Jubilee."

New Email names for you!

Get the Email name you've always wanted on the new @ymail and @rocketmail. Hurry before someone else does!





What is MTCN?

Date: Tuesday, March 2, 2010, 4:44 PM

Ti Hsieh wrote:

>

> i can not received any bank transaction because there no check book with me here and i advices to check any nearby western union office or outlet around you send the money to the information will get here...

> Here's my info below



How to build the trust?

 If only I have some social relationship information available...






S. Felix Wu




- S. Felix found some Treasured Golden Mystery Eggs to share with their friends!
- S. Felix was just feeding Ben Y. Zhao's chickens and made them so happy that they laid an extra batch of Treasured Golden Mystery Eggs!



about a minute ago via FarmVille 🔒 · Comment · Like · Hatch an egg









Lee Han Kim



Rainbow King



Wai Hung Yeung



Chien-Ke Lan



Chien-Ke just found some Treasured wants to say thank you!


Chien-Ke just harvested their chicken coo Treasured Golden Mystery Eggs, and want feeding the chickens!



🚜 about an hour ago via FarmVille 🗎 - Comment - Like - Ha


r "http://www.facebook.com/apps/application.php?id=130529466968382"







Gamers Unite!





How to build the trust?

 If only I have some social relationship information available...





S. Felix Wu




S. Felix found some Treasured Golden Mystery Eggs to share with their friends!

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
DEMO time...

Understanding Dynamics of Behavior in Social Circles

Jennifer Golbeck and Ugur Kuter University of Maryland, College Park

CSI: College Park

• Research at the intersections of social trust networks, probabilistic reasoning, game theory and planning



Game theory

Probabilistic Models

Social Trust

Web Service Composition

Social Networks

Web Page (under construction): www.csicp.org

In this talk,

- How to make decisions and act, when
 - you're working on a physical transportation network,
 - you're interacting with a social group,
 - you do not know individual tendencies (e.g., altrusim, fairness, individualistic) in the group,
 - you do not know the group's collective tendencies (e.g., cooperativeness).

Outline

- Understanding cooperativeness in groups
 - Cooperativeness as a measure of intentions of the group
 - Other factors that go into intentions/objectives understanding?
- Ongoing: Learning how to adapt to an adversarial group
- Ongoing: Dynamics of social trust relationships among a group of agents
 - Among humans as well as mixed human/software agent groups
 - Evaluation framework: strategy games
- Conclusions and Future Work

Understanding Cooperativeness

- In most of the time, we're living in a Darwinian society where the survival of the fittest is the prominent rule
- Research Questions:
 - How and why cooperative behavior emerges given that selfish individuals can gain by taking advantage of other?
 - How to model an agent behavior in a social environment?
 - How to define the cooperativeness of a group?

Evolution of Cooperation


- Existing research typically utilize games for modeling social dilemmas about cooperating and defecting
 - E.g., Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)

Prisoner's Dilemma		Player 2	
		Cooperate (C)	Defect (D)
Player 1	Cooperate (C)	(3, 3)	(0, 5)
	Defect (D)	(5,0)	(1,1)

- Played only once:
 - Defect (D) always provides a higher individual payoff
 - But mutual cooperation (C) is socially optimal
- Played **repeatedly** for an unknown number of times:
 - i.e., Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD)
 - Cooperative behavior (e.g., Tit-for-Tat) might emerge to increase accumulated payoff

Social Value Orientation (SVO) Theory

- SVO is a social choice theory [Messick and McClintock in 1968]
- Based on empirical evidence, SVO states that:
 - Individuals vary in their interpersonal social tendencies
 - Individual's behavior may often be motivated not only by self-interest but also by the consequences for the others
 - These reflect stable and consistent orientations




Our Contributions (GECCO-10, IAT-10)

- Proposed a new model
 - Based on Social Value Orientation (SVO) theory in social and behavioral science
 - Explicitly captures the notion of pro-social vs. pro-self orientations exhibited in human behavior
- Analyzed steady state behaviors
- Provided a new definition for cooperativeness using social orientation of players
 - Independent of the average payoff and game matrix
 - Accurately describe some situations that using average payoffs as a measure of cooperativeness cannot

Our SVO-inspired Model

player *j* 's total payoff


Social-orientation space



player i's total payoff

- Social orientation (θ_i) of Player i
 - A model of the player's tendency to adopt a prosocial or pro-self behavior
- Examples:
 - $\theta_i = 0$ => individualistic
 - $\theta_i = \pi/4 =$ fair
 - $\theta_i = \pi/2 => altruistic$

How a player behaves based on its θ ?



player i's total payoff

- Each player aims to bring its own expected payoff closer to its social-orientation
 - E(t,D): accumulated payoff that Player i receives until iteration t
 - Choose an action, a, such that the deviation angle α_a is minimized

 $a = \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in A} \cos \alpha_a$

Summary of results

2x2 symmetric game		Player 2	
		Cooperate (C)	Defect (D)
Player 1	Cooperate (C)	(R,R)	(S,T)
1 layer 1	Defect (D)	(T,S)	(P, P)

(WLOG, assume $\theta_i \leq \theta_i$)

$$\theta_i + \theta_i < 90$$

$$\theta_i + \theta_j = 90$$

$$\theta_i + \theta_j < 90$$
 $\theta_i + \theta_j = 90$ $\theta_i + \theta_j > 90$

Both players are pro-self $\Theta_{\rm i}$ < 45, $\theta_{\rm i}$ < 45

Both players always defect at each game in steady state

Both players are pro-social $\Theta_i > 45$, $\theta_i > 45$

Both players always cooperate at each game in steady state

One pro-self, one prosocial, i.e., $\theta_i < 45, \, \theta_i > 45$

Pro-self player i gets $\Theta_i(T+S)$, and prosocial player j gets $(1-\Theta_i)(T+S)$ at each game in steady state Player 1 gets

$$\bar{p}_i = \frac{SP - PT}{(P - T) - (P - S)\frac{1 - r_i}{r_i}}$$

Player 2 gets

$$\bar{p}_j = \bar{p}_i \frac{1 - r_i}{r_i}$$

Player 1 gets

$$\bar{p}_i = \bar{p}_j \frac{1 - r_j}{r_j}$$


Player 2 gets
$$\bar{p}_j = \frac{TR - RS}{(R - S) - (R - T)\frac{1 - r_j}{r_j}}$$

How to Define the Cooperativeness?

- Traditional definition: Average payoff obtained by players
 - Higher the average payoff, more cooperative the society
 - May not be accurate, e.g., defecting may lead to high payoff sometimes
 - We will illustrate it in the following experiments
- Our definition: Social orientation of players
 - $\theta_i \ge \pi/4 =>$ Player i is cooperative
 - Cooperativeness of a society = avg θ or % of cooperative agents
 - Independent of the average payoff and game matrix

Experiments


- Investigate emergence of cooperative populations based on social orientations of individuals
- Use Evolutionary Simulations
 - Players play IPD with each other
 - Replicator dynamics
 - each player has a number of offspring that is proportional to its expected total payoff
 - Initial population
 - Randomly generated 10 θ values from the interval [0, $\pi/2$]
 - Size of a group with a particular θ value constitutes 10% of the entire population
 - Mutation
 - On average, once in every 100 generations, introduce a small amount of new randomly-chosen mutant players



Varying R

2x2 symmetric game		Player 2	
		Cooperate (C)	Defect (D)
Player 1	Cooperate (C) Defect (D)	(R,R) (T,S)	(S,T) (P,P)
Player 1	Defect (D)	(T, R)	(P,P)

- R in [2.5, 5]
 - keeping the S, T and P constant with their original values
 - keeping the preference relations in the PD matrix, i.e., S < P < R < T and 2R > S + T
- Result: pro-social tendency increases with increasing reward (R) as expected




Varying P

2x2 symmetric game		Player 2	
		Cooperate (C)	Defect (D)
Player 1	Cooperate (C) Defect (D)	(R,R) (T,S)	(S,T) (P,P)

- Average payoff increases when P increases
- Average θ drops sharply when P is large
 - Contradicts with the predictions of standard definition of cooperativeness!
 - No one-to-one correlation between the average payoff and the group's cooperativeness

Why are the evolved groups different?



Importance of this work


- Showed the advantage of using social orientation of players and payoffs as a metric for the society's cooperativeness level
- However, this result suggests that understanding, gametheoretically, the dynamics of a group's behavior has some open, interesting issues
 - While previous works using average payoff as a metric of the degree of cooperation may not be accurate sometimes
 - Next slides on two ongoing works on social trust in groups


Trust and Credibility in Social Groups

- We will define and implement a series of increasingly complex games that involve
 - information-gathering, information-hiding, negotiations over physical resources
- In developing these games, we will require the following features:
 - Players do not know who is working with them or against them, so trust is initially unknown.
 - Players must interact and exchange resources (e.g. money, information, etc.) so there are bases for establishing a history that will influence trust.
 - Payoffs will depend on identifying who is trustworthy, so players have an incentive to investigate and establish trust in others.
- Objective: analyze the game data to understand how the players develop trust in each other and how their trust changes over the course of the games



- All players are heading to the center.
 - The bad player wins if he gets to the center ahead of at least one good player.
 - Otherwise the good team wins.
- Players draw cards at the beginning of the game that will state if they are good or bad.
- Resources and requirements
 - Resources can be exchanged between players.
 - They can be traded, given away, or exchanged with promise of something in return later.
 - There are no rules to prevent players from lying or going back on promises anything is fair!






Research Objectives and Results

- Understand how trust develops between people in social networks that change over time
- Build computational models of the dynamics of trust to guide decision-making and acting
- Paper in preparation for CHI-11

Trust in Social Groups with Hidden Roles/Objectives

- Example:
 - Two groups of agents: Orange, Blue
 - All agents interact with each other for some number of iterations
 - n_{Orange} + n_{Blue} agents; each agent only knows its role, but not others'
 - One can guess; but cannot be 100% sure until the end of the game
 - Winning condition
 - The group with high average accumulated payoff wins the game
- Research Question: how should a player represent and learn to adapt its trust to the others in the network?



Approach

- 2-population co-evolutionary model
 - "Gene" = initial trust value + trust-update rules
 - The fitness of an individual is computed by evaluating the individual against a number of individuals from the other group
- With this model, evolutionary computation will give us:
 - Automated generation/simulation of agent's trust models
 - Improve old models by arm race
 - Learning strategies for acting based on trust, from adversarial behavior
- We're currently working on the formalism of our model and algorithms, and are implementing the setup for pilot tests

Conclusions

- Described a new model for understanding cooperativeness in groups
 - Cooperativeness as a measure of intentions of the group
 - Other factors that go into intentions/objectives understanding?
- Ongoing: Learning how to adapt to an adversarial group
- Ongoing: Dynamics of social trust relationships among a group of agents
 - Among humans as well as mixed human/software agent groups
 - Evaluation framework: strategy games
- Future work: Develop a formalism (Behavior Network Diagrams) to analyze the above factors together
- Future Work: Using BNDs to do adversarial planning/decision making



Motivating, abstract scenario

 Consider a humanitarian group trying to deliver supplies to a village that is suffering after a natural disaster.




- The transportation network provides many options for bringing in the support:
 - routes for helicopters, trucks, and people moving on foot.
- Several groups of people interacting
 - Relief people, Villagers, Militia, Others

Backup Slides

Importance of this work

- Described a formal model with insights from social and behavioral sciences
 - Analyzed the steady state behaviors
 - Showed the advantage of using social orientation of players as a metric for the society's cooperativeness level
 - While previous works using average payoff as a metric of the degree of cooperation may not be accurate sometimes
- We are in the process of performing more extensive evaluations of this controversial result
- However, this result suggests that understanding, game-theoretically, the dynamics of a group's behavior has some open, interesting issues
 - Next slides on two ongoing works

An example: a Fair player in IPD



- Player i is fair, i.e., $\theta_i = 45^\circ$
- Player j is random
- $g_1 = \langle 0, 0 \rangle$
- i chooses C (j chooses D)
- $g_2 = g_1 + \langle 0, 5 \rangle = \langle 0, 5 \rangle$
- i chooses D (j chooses D)
- $g_3 = g_2 + \langle 1, 1 \rangle = \langle 1, 6 \rangle$
- i chooses D (j chooses C)
- $g_4 = g_3 + \langle 5, o \rangle = \langle 6, 6 \rangle$
- i chooses C
- Similar to Tit-for-Tat


What happens in Steady State?

 Our theoretical analyses showed predictions on the behavior conditioned on initial social orientations

2x2 symmetric game		Player 2	
		Cooperate (C)	Defect (D)
Player 1	Cooperate (C) Defect (D)	(R,R) (T,S)	(S,T) (P,P)

- Five possible cases for each game in steady state:
 - If both i & j are pro-self, then both players always defect
 - If both i & j are pro-social, then both always cooperate
 - If i is pro-social, but j is Pro-self, then Player i gets $r_i(T+S)$, and Player j gets $(1-r_i)(T+S)$

Cycle of Cooperation and Defection



- Results confirm the previous findings in Evolution of Cooperation (Axelrod 1980):
 - Average payoff varies between P and R, which correspond to full defection and full cooperation, respectively

Example

- Each agent keeps track of trustworthiness, t_i, of other agents, -1 ≤ t_i ≤ 1
 - Agent 2 has t₁ = 1 means 2 has high trust in agent 1
 - i.e., agent j belief that agent i's behavior is similar to its, so they're in the same team
 - Agent 2 has $t_1 = -1$ means 2 has low trust in 1
 - i.e., agent j belief that agent i's behavior will against agent j's plans
- After each iteration, t_i is updated based on the history, according to the following updating rule
 - H -> Δt_H , where H is the history of interaction
 - E.g., t_2 =0.1 and $\langle (C,C),...,(C,C) \rangle$ -> 0.1, then t_2 is updated to 0.2 if the history is $\langle (C,C),...,(C,C) \rangle$


Related work on modeling agent's behavior



- Game-theoretical approaches
 - Use rationality assumption, i.e., maximizing their own utility
- Several models for evolution of cooperation
 - Examples
 - Lookup table e.g., [Axelrod 87]
 - Probabilities of cooperation e.g., [Nowak and Sigmund 93]
 - Finite state automata e.g., [Linster 92]
 - Neural networks e.g., [Harrald and Fogel 96]
 - Most of them did not explicitly take the payoff of the other player into account
- Research in social and behavioral sciences
 - E.g., Social Value Orientation (SVO) Theory

Game Play:

- There are three good players and one bad player.
- All players are heading to the earth at the center.
 - The bad player wins if he gets to the center ahead of at least one good player.
 - Otherwise the good team wins.
- Players draw cards at the beginning of the game that will state if they are good or bad.
 - They keep these cards private so no one truly knows the goodness or badness of other players.
- At the beginning of each round, the players each roll the die.
 - The player draws the number of resource cards as is shown on the die.
 - All players roll for resources in all rounds, even once they have reached the center



- After rolling, players draw requirement cards for each path they might want to cross.
- To move, a player must turn in resource cards to pay the cost of the path they will take, and they must show the requirement card at the same time. All cards go into a discard pile.
- Resources can be exchanged between players.
 - They can be traded, given away, or exchanged with promise of something in return later.
 - There are no rules to prevent players from lying or going back on promises anything is fair!

Trust-Based Applications and Interfaces for the Social Web

John O'Donovan,
Dept. of Computer Science. University of California,
Santa Barbara.

Outline

"We need better ways to model and represent trust..."

Past Work...

(At University College Dublin, and Univ. Southern California)

Trust on the Social Web (PhD Thesis)

Example Studies: Trust Modeling for Recommender Systems

Trust Modeling for Online Auctions

Currently...

(At Univ. of California Santa Barbara)

Trust-based Interfaces for Recommender Systems Interactive analysis of trust networks.

Example: SmallWorlds

Next...

Transparent Trust Models?

Portable and Standardized?

The role of the user interface for trust and uncertainty information.

Linked Data & semantic web solutions?


Examples: WiGis and WiGiPedia.

Our Knowledge Repository- 1910

WHEN IN DOUBT-"LOOK IT UP" IN

The

Encyclopaedia Britannica



(New 11th Edition) Issued 1910-11 by the CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (England)


The Sum of Human Knowledge


29 volumes, 28,150 pages, 44,000,000 words of text. Printed on thin, but strong opaque India paper, each volume but one inch in thickness.


THE BOOK TO ASK QUESTIONS OF

FOR READING OR FOR STUDY


The "Traditional" Web (aka 1.0)








Previous Work on Trust.




Example 1: Modeling trust in a recommender system.

- •Collaborative filtering algorithms rely too heavily on profile similarity.
- •Trustworthiness of users is an important factor to be considered.
- •Trust can be non-invasively inferred from user rating histories.
- •Trust values can easily be incorporated into the mechanics of a standard collaborative filtering algorithm to yield better robustness and predictive accuracy results.

Standard Collaborative Filtering



Trust-Based Collaborative Filtering




Building the trust model


$$Trust^{I}(p,i) = \frac{|\{(c_k,i_k) \in CorrectSet(p) : i_k = i\}|}{|\{(c_k,i_k) \in RecSet(p) : i_k = i\}|}$$

$$Trust^{P}(p) = \frac{|CorrectSet(p)|}{|RecSet(p)|}$$

Trust-Based Collaborative Filtering



Example 2: AuctionRules Trust-mining Algorithm





Example 2: AuctionRules Trust-mining Algorithm

We designed a lightweight NLP classification algorithm specifically for extracting the polarity of sentiment in online auction comments on eBay...

Representing the Auction as a Set of Features

- Item The quality/condition of the product being bought or sold. (item, product)
- Person The person the user makes the transaction with. (buyer, seller, eBayer, dealer)
- Cost Cost of item, cost of shipping, hidden costs etc. (expense, cost)
- Shipping Delivery of the item, security, time etc. (delivery, shipping)
- Response Communication with the other party, emails, feedback comment responses. (response, comment, email, communication)
- Packaging The packaging quality/condition of the item packaging
- Payment how the payment will be made to the seller, or back to buyer for return (payment)
- Transaction the overall transaction quality (Service, Transaction, Business)





Current Work

at CS Dept, UCSB

 Broad area of interactive network analysis (with trust data) for social web and other applications.

Five Ongoing Projects:


- WiGi: Web-based Interactive Graph Interfaces
- WiGiPedia: Interactive visualizations for eliciting trustworthy semantic data in WikiPedia.
- SmallWorlds: Interactive Trust-based recommender system for Facebook.
- TopicNets: Visual, Interactive and Real-Time Exploration of Topic-based relations in diverse datasets.
- Provenance Visualization: Interactive visualization of provenance and trust data for complex scientific process flows

WiGis Framework:

Scalable Interactive Visualization of >1M networked entities An order of magnitude more scalable than the next best web based graph tool

Customizable
Semantic
Framework. Map
any data field- (eg:
Trust, Similarity) to a
Graph Dimension
Rich search
functionalities, Node,
Edge, Group and
Shortest Path
Highlighting

Native in all major browsers, with no plugins (flash, java etc)




Overview and Zoom Navigation


Visualize Remote algorithms running on local data in real time

Feature Rich: Layout, Clustering and Interaction algorithms

Seamless Transition between client (local) and server based (remote) data models. Graph representations synchronized through AJAX.







All structured data components (infobox, categories, visualization) are placed in the same vicinity

Sound, The Pink Floyd

Psychedelic rock

1965-1996, 2005

EMI, Harvest, Capitol, Tower,

Sigma 6. Joker's Wild, Zee

www.pinkfloyd.co.uk

www.pinkflovd.comr

[edit]

Syd Barrett

Bob Klose

Nick Mason

Richard Wright



■ Gaeilge m Galego

★ 한국어

ա Հայերեն

= İslenska עברית =

= ಕನ್ನಡ * 35mmmm

= Kiswahili

= Latina

■ Latviešu

m Lietuviu

॥ हिन्दी = Hrvatski

m Ido ■ Bahasa Indonesia Categories: Pink Floyd | Musical groups established in 1965 | Musical groups disestablished in 1996 | English progressive rock groups | Psychedelic rock music groups | 1960s music groups | 1970s music groups | 1980s music groups | 1990s music groups | Musical guartets | Rock and Roll Hall of Fame inductees | Grammy Award winners | Capitol Records artists | Polar Music Prize laureates


Early years (1963-1967)


Nick Mason and Roger Waters met at the Regent Street Polytechnic in London, where both were studying architecture. [1] The pair first played together in a band formed by Keith Noble

and Clive Metcalfe, along with Noble's sister Sheilagh, an occasional singer. They were joined later by fellow student Richard Wright. With the addition of Wright the band became a sextet, and took the name Sigma 6.[2] Wright's girlfriend Juliette Gale was often a guest artist, and Waters initially played rhythm guitar before switching to bass. Early gigs were for private functions, and the band rehearsed in a tearoom in the basement of Regent Street Polytechnic. Sigma 6 played songs by The Searchers as well as material written by fellow student Ken Chapman, who became their manager and songwriter.[2]



facebook & 🗷 🚱 Search






Some new directions for this work:

- Trust and Provenance API for WiGis Framework. ...
 allowing different trust models to plug in seamlessly,
 so that network effects can be visualized and the
 model can be understood more easily.
- Promotion of this interaction framework within the community of trust researchers.
- TopicTrust: Using LDA techniques to infer trust between different entities though their topic relations. (using our novel and fast algorithms from TopicNets)

Research Questions

- What are the roles of both interface and interaction in trust-based systems.
- How does transparency introduced by the interface change the user's experience.
- Does transparency and interaction (dynamic provision of data) effect robustness and stability of a trust based system?
- How can Linked Data and better semantic relations be leveraged to build a reliable, open and portable trust model?



Recommended for You



The Amityville Horror



Hostel
(Why is this recommended for you?)



The Legend of Zelda: Twilight Princess (Why is this recommended for you?)

See more Recommendations

Documentary Crime Comedy Children's Animation Adventure Film-Moir Horror Musical Mystery Romance Comedy Children's Animation Adventure Thriller

Personalizing Trust in Online Auctions

John O'Donovan +, Vesile Evrim*, Barry Smyth+. Dennis McLeod*, Paddy Nixon+.

- (+) Adaptive Information Cluster, Department of Computer Science, University College Dublin
- (*) Semantic Information Lab, Viterbi School of Engineering. University of Southern California

(Publications: STAIRS. Riva Del Garda AUG 28th 2006, IJCAI 2007, Hyderabad, India)

Motivations

- •Buyers and sellers in online auctions are faced with the task of deciding who to entrust their business to based on a very limited amount of information.
- •Over 99% of the feedback comments left on eBay are positive. This is a large bias and can be misleading.

Motivations

- •There is a large amount of *hidden* negativity in. feedback comments
- •For Example: User (a) gives a positive rating for a transaction with user (b) and leaves the following: "Nice Item, but shipping was too expensive and the item was poorly packaged"
- •This scenario occurs frequently on auction sites such as eBay because users are afraid to leave negative comments for fear of retaliatory negative feedback. (Resnick 02)

Main Point

•We introduce a new way to calculate trust for online auctions based on classification of user feedback and show how the resultant trust can be tailored for different users.

Background

Gamon et al. [3] introduce the concept of varying the level of granularity during the classification procedure, finding that "varying the level of granularity of analysis allows the discovery of new information".

Yukari et al. ('04) Introduces the idea of salient satisfaction factors as a mechanism for classifying negative comments.

•Pang and Lee ('02) Experiments with sentiment classification in freetext comments. Found that machine learning algorithms generally performed poorly at this task.

Extracting Trust from Feedback Comments

Sub-Problem: automatically attaining accurate classification of feedback comments into +'ve and -'ve

Solutions: Machine Learning?

(no specific domain knowledge needed, scalable, portable to different auctions, training data..., what type of ML algorithm is best? How accurate/reliable??)

Natural Language Processing?


(domain knowledge required- but how much?, is it portable to other auctions without changing the domain knowledge? How accurate?)

NLP Approach: AuctionRules Algorithm

We designed an NLP classification algorithm specifically for extracting the polarity of sentiment in online auction comments...


Representing the Auction as a Set of Features

- Item The quality/condition of the product being bought or sold. (item, product)
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- Shipping Delivery of the item, security, time etc. (delivery, shipping)
- Response Communication with the other party, emails, feedback comment responses. (response, comment, email, communication)
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


A Social Network Diagram

eBay Trust Network



Generated by TrustMe- Graph Generator on johnod.net; using PieSpy 0.4.0 Blue edge thickness and shortness represents strength of relationship http://www.iibble.org/piespy/ - This frame was drawn at Mon May 08 23:26:23 PDT 2006



Trust and Incentives A Dynamical Perspective

Munindar P. Singh
(Joint work with Christopher J. Hazard)
singh@ncsu.edu

North Carolina State University

Motivating Question and Findings

What are the consequences of approaching trust from the standpoint of incentives?

- Natural axioms relating trust and incentives
- Trustworthiness maps to patience (discount factor)
- Reputation models as mechanisms
 - Govern agents' behaviors
 - Can be analyzed as dynamical systems
- Intuitive desiderata for reputation models map to technical properties
- Yield a principled basis for comparing existing systems
 - Contrast with traditional, anecdotal evaluations

Singh (NCSU) Trust and Incentives 2 / 20

Defining Trustworthiness

Scalar

Preference Prefer b to c if b would fulfill more costly


commitment than c


Strength Do something costly \Rightarrow will do something

cheaper

Stability Preferences stable if time shifted

Intertemporal Discounting and Its Estimation





Trustworthiness and Discount Factor Isomorphism Proof Sketch

- Compare two agents
- From Preference and Scalar properties, examine one event
- ► Individual rationality ⇒ agent expects a net positive utility (future utility from relationship)
- ▶ If *b* will fulfill commitment that *c* will not, *b*'s perceived utility > *c*'s perceived utility
- Stability: perceived utility inequalities \Rightarrow constant multiplicative factor, x^t (because $x^{t+s} = x^t \cdot x^s$)
- ➤ x can break inequalities from trustworthiness definition ⇒ x related to trustworthiness
- Utility and domain of x match standard discounting

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Trust and Reputation Dynamics


- Agents' utilities are functions of their reputations
- Reputation dynamics with strategic agent
 - Formalizing key desiderata
- Conceptual interface for reputation systems
 - Update function: next reputation after action
 - Payoff function: reward for action given reputation
- Compare reputation systems

Trust System Metrics: Notation


- ▶ Agent type: $\theta \in \Theta$
- ▶ Current reputation (projection): $r \in R$
- Next reputation function: Ω
 - $ightharpoonup r' = \Omega_{\theta}(r)$
- Fixed point reputation function: χ
 - $\lambda(\theta) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \Omega_{\theta}^{n}(r_{\text{initial}})$

Singh (NCSU)


Dynamic Reputation Graphs



Ideal Trust System




Good Trust System



Trust System Metric 1: Unambiguity

Each agent type asymptotically maps to a single reputation value



Ambiguous Trust Systems

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Trust System Metric 2: Monotonicity


- ► Ideally Patient Strategic (IPS) agent
 - ► Infinite horizon, maximize utility
- ▶ If θ_a is weakly preferable to θ_b to IPS agent \Rightarrow asymptotically, a's reputation $\geq b$'s reputation

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Trust System Metric 3: Convergence

Reputation should converge quickly near the fixed point

- ▶ Max component of gradient: $||\nabla \Omega(r)||_{\infty} < 1$ and minimized
- Lyapunov stability may be acceptable




Divergent Trust Systems

Trust System Metric 4: Accuracy

Minimize average error over distribution of types

- ▶ Error: absolute distance from ideal reputation
- ▶ Reputation system performance when beliefs far from fixed point




Differing Accuracy

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Probabilistic Reciprocity Graph


Probability of favor based on balance [Sen 2002]



Singh (NCSU) Trust and Incentives 15 / 20

Discount Factor Graph

Trustworthiness ~ patience [Hazard & Singh 2010; Smith & desJardins 2009]



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Results


Rep. System	Unambig.	Monotonicity	Convergence	Accuracy
Beta (suplin)	yes	monotonic	0 and 0.9	0.4
Beta (linear, sublin)	yes	nondiscriminatory	0.9	0.45
Certainty	no	_	1	_
Discount Factor	yes	monotonic	< 0.1	0.02
Prob. Reciprocity	no	monotonic	no	0.2
Sporas (suplin, linear)	yes	monotonic	≈ 0	0.3
Sporas (sublin)	yes	nonmonotonic	no	0.4
Travos	yes	monotonic	0.8	0.2

- ▶ Beta, Certainty, Travos models [Jøsang 1998; Wang & Singh 2006, 2007; Teacy et al. 2006]
 - Probability of positive and negative interactions
- ► Sporas [Zacharia & Maes 2000]
 - ► Reputation measured and dampened



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Empirical Reputation Dynamics from Amazon



Conclusions and Directions

Beginning from incentives leads naturally to dynamical analyses

- Discount factor isomorphic to trustworthiness given assumptions
- Desiderata are first major step in comparing diverse reputation systems
- Discount factor model performs well, does not yet support continuous choices

Singh (NCSU) Trust and Incentives 19 / 20

Thanks!

http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/mpsingh/

Trust as a Basis for Social Computing

Munindar P. Singh

North Carolina State University

July 2010

Notions of Trust

Existing literature

- Subjective
 - As a conglomerate of mental attitudes
- Social
 - Based on social relationships
- Distributed
 - Based on certificate chains
- Measured applied to the above
 - Based on heuristics, probabilities, utility, . . .

Traditional approaches emphasize estimation over meaning

Applying Trust for Social Computing

Trust underlies all interactions among autonomous parties

- ▶ Trust reflects the trustor's *dependence* on the trustee
- Currently, trust is applied
 - Embedded into each specific application
 - Not reusable
- Many types of social relationships, each nuanced
 - Acquaintanceship
 - Friendship
 - Organizational
 - Task-specific
- How may we abstract out trust to apply it as a basis for social computing applications?

Programming Social Applications Approach

Specify and configure


- Roles
- Social interactions
- Their effects on social states
- Any additional constraints

Programming Social Applications

Middleware

- Offer primitives for social interactions
 - Communicating
 - Maintaining social state
 - Computing trust on behalf of a participant

Social Middleware to Support Social Applications



Architecture Conceptually

How a system is organized


- Primarily its ingredients
 - Components
 - Connectors
- An architectural style
 - Constraints on components and connectors
 - Patterns on components and connectors

Architecture Examples

Components; connectors; constraints; patterns

- Electrical system
 - Power elements (sources, sinks); conductors; no short circuits; star
 - How do we characterize the elements and conductors logically?
 - Current drawn, voltage expected, impedance offered
- Social system
 - Individuals; social relationships; ?; ?
 - How do we characterize the individuals and their relationships?
 - Claim: Trust is what flows over a relationship
 - Can we characterize relationships in a reusable manner, even though not domain-independent?

Social Middleware Related to Architecture



Understanding Trust in Architectural Terms

General Model of Trust


- Notions of dependence
- Conditional
- Compositional
- Semantic
- General

Trust from a Logical Standpoint

- ► T_{trustor,trustee}(antecedent, consequent)
 - ► T_{Alice, Bob} (raise alert, send warning)
 - ▶ $T_{trustor,trustee}(\top,consequent)$: unconditional trust
- ▶ ACTIVATE: $\mathsf{T}_{x,y}(r,u) \land r \to \mathsf{T}_{x,y}(\top,u)$
 - T_{Alice,Bob}(raise alert, send warning) ∧ raise alert
 ⇒ T_{Alice,Bob}(⊤, send warning)
- ▶ COMPLETE: $u \rightarrow \neg \mathsf{T}_{x,y}(r,u)$
 - ▶ send warning $\Rightarrow \neg T_{Alice,Bob}$ (raise alert, send warning)
 - send warning ⇒ ¬T_{Alice,Bob}(⊤, send warning)

A formal semantics underlies the above notion

Schematic of an Architectural Connector as Trust



Active trust basics

(Omitting trustor and trustee when they are the same throughout)

- Complete a connector: dependence has been fulfilled
 - ▶ $u \rightarrow \neg T(r, u)$
- Activate a connector: make dependence stronger (strongest when $r = \top$)
 - $T(r \wedge s, u) \wedge r \rightarrow T(s, u)$
- Partition a connector: a dependence for two things is a dependence for each separately (if it isn't already done)
 - $T(r, u \wedge v) \wedge \neg u \to T(r, u)$

Connector integrity

- Avoid conflict: dependence must be internally consistent
 - ightharpoonup $T(r, u) \rightarrow \neg T(r, \neg u)$
- Nonvacuity: dependence must be for something tangible
 - ▶ From $r \vdash u$ infer $\neg T(r, u)$
- Tighten: if a dependence holds then a narrower dependence also holds
 - ▶ From $T(r, u), s \vdash r, s \not\vdash u$ infer T(s, u)

Connector structure

- ► Combine antecedents: two connectors with the same consequent (fulfillment condition) yield a broader connector
 - $ightharpoonup T(r,u) \wedge T(s,u) \rightarrow T(r \vee s,u)$
- Combine consequents: two connectors with the same antecedent (trigger condition) yield a stronger connector
 - $T(r,u) \wedge T(r,v) \rightarrow T(r,u \wedge v)$
- Chain: two chained dependencies yield a combined dependence
 - From $T(r, u), u \vdash s, T(s, v)$ infer T(r, v)

Connector meaning


- Exposure: the trustee's commitment is its level of exposure if the trustor trusts it for it
- Transient alignment: when the trustee commits to support the dependency
 - $ightharpoonup T_{x,y}(r,u)
 ightarrow C_{y,x}(r,u)$
- Well-placed trust: when trust is fulfilled in the actual execution
 - ▶ $\mathsf{T}_{x,v}(\mathsf{true},u) \to \mathsf{R}u$
- Whole-hearted alignment: when trust is backed by a steady commitment until success
 - $T_{x,v}(s,v) \to \mathsf{R}(s \to (\mathsf{C}_{v,x}(s,v) \mathsf{U} v))$

(Above, $C_{x,y}(r, u)$ refers to a commitment from x to y; R indicates "on the real execution path"; and pUq means p holds until q does)




TRUSTEE'S TEAM, Schematically

If you trust a team member, you trust the team




TRANSIENT ALIGNMENT, Schematically

The trustee is committed to what you trust them for




TRUSTOR'S TEAM, Schematically

Your team trusts whom you trust



PARALLEL TEAMWORK, Schematically

If you trust each other, you are part of a team



Directions

- Formalizing architectures for social computing based on trust
 - How can trust fit into an overall system architecture?
- Identifying suitable architecture styles
 - What are suitable patterns for different types of social applications?
- Mapping effectively to existing representations and estimation techniques
 - Computation paths can be used as a basis for judging probabilities and expected utilities

Research topics

- 1) Linguistics translation to machine understanding (Ron, Chris) -2
- 2) Dynamics of trust (Cho) (Munindar) 4
 - How trust changes over time?
 - Forgiveness
 - Regretfulness
- 3) Trust/risk model, impact on decision making/uncertainty management (Kevin) 2,5
- 4) Human behavior to Trust (context, intention, motivation, cooperative vs. self-centered, reward/incentives) (Ugur) 4
- 5) Trust aggregation and inference (Ron, Ugur) 4
- 6) Distrust (Jen)1.2
- 7) Property of trust systems (virtual trust plane) (Felix) 3.5
- 8) Framework for integrating and leveraging of trust relationship (Mike)3
- 9) Engineering of trust systems (incentive) (Munindar) 1
- 10) Communication of trust (John) -3